The central question I ask in my dissertation is how global production networks and foreign investment shape democratic policymaking in the developing world. I am particularly interested in how international financial flows affect some regions, classes, sectors, and individuals more than others, and I explore how these shifts affect the patterns of demands for redistribution. While states are often constrained by forces in the global market economy, my work also emphasizes the opportunities that global markets present.

My work stands in opposition to scholars who suggest that economic integration is shifting power away from the nation-state, such as Raymond Vernon, Fernando Cardoso, and Dani Rodrik, as well as scholars such as Susan Strange and Robert Gilpin who see democratic politics as becoming less important in the face of deeper economic integration. My research suggests that some policymakers will be more constrained than others, but that much of the effects of investment lies in the sectoral effects of the investment as well as domestic factors like corruption and partisan politics. My research also adds to our understanding of the conditional role of economic integration and its effects at the regional and municipal level, whereas previous research has been largely focused on national level differences. That is, my work rejects the notion that economic integration is a phenomenon with uniform effects across the world. Instead, I focus on its effects on regions, cities, and even individuals. To that end, I examine how heterogeneity within countries interacts with foreign investment and financial flows. My dissertation shows that because of that heterogeneity, foreign investment can increase inequality both within and across states.